Myths and Realities of Long-run Development: A Look at Deeper
      Determinants by Hassan, Lubna
The Pakistan Development Review 
46 : 1 (Spring 2007) pp. 19–44 
 
 
 
 
Myths and Realities of Long-run Development:  
A Look at Deeper Determinants 
 
LUBNA HASAN* 
 
It has long been realised that factor accumulation and technological development are only 
proximate causes of economic development, and the focus has now shifted to investigating the 
‘deeper determinants’ of economic growth. Two such forces are highlighted in  the literature: 
institutions and geography. However, it remains controversial as to which of these two is the more 
important. The “institutions school” assigns primal importance to institutions, whereas the 
“geography school” considers geographical factors as the primary determinant of the economic 
performance of countries. This paper reviews the debate surrounding these “deeper determinants” 
of economic performance. It reviews the work of these two schools of thought and their 
interpretation of the long-run development. The paper then examines the evidence provided by the 
respective schools in favour of their hypotheses. It concludes in favour of the Institutions 
hypothesis as the Geography school does not provide a consistent story of long-run development. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The world income is very unevenly distributed across countries. While the average 
annual income of one billion people living in high-income economies is about $27000, 
that of 2.5 billion people living in low-income economies is a mere  $430 [World Bank 
(2004)]. What explains these phenomenal differences in economic performance?  
Until recently, economists had conveniently attributed it to the process of capital 
accumulation and technological development, in line with the predictions of neoclassical 
growth theory. However, the theory was unable to provide an explanation for some basic 
question as to why some countries accumulate more capital and innovate faster than 
others. As North and Thomas (1973) write, “if all that is required for economic growth is 
investment and innovation, why have some societies missed this desirable outcome?”  
So, now capital accumulation and productivity growth are considered as 
“proximate” causes only, and the focus has shifted to investigating “deeper determinants” 
of growth.1 What are these “deeper determinants”? Literature highlights geography and 
institutions as two such candidates. However, there is no consensus about which one of 
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1See Rodrik, et al. (2004) and Easterly and Levine (2003). Also see, Bloch and Tang (2004), 
Przeworski (2004), and Woods (2004) for a review of some of the issues. Also see Kibritcioglu and Dibooglu 
(2001) and Snowdon (2006) for an interesting discussion of Long-run growth. 
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these is more important. The “institutions school” argues for institutions as the 
fundamental cause, while the “geography school” considers geography as the primary 
determinant.  Consequently, a debate has ensued which remains inconclusive till today. 
Figure 1 below describes the analytical framework within which much of this discourse 
takes place. Factors endowments and productivity are treated as the proximate causes of 
growth, which in turn are determined by the institutions and geography. 
 
Fig. 1. The Deeper Determinants of Growth—Analytical Framework 
 
Source: Rodrik (2003). 
 
This paper reviews the debate about deeper determinants of growth. The structure 
of paper is as follows. The next two sections review the two schools of thought with 
focus on main theoretical contributions within each school, their explanation of the long-
run development, and empirical evidence provided in support of their hypotheses. Section 
two reviews the geography school and the third section discusses the institutions school. 
The fourth section is devoted to the debate and the final section concludes. 
 
2. GEOGRAPHY AS DESTINY 
The geography school of thought has a long pedigree and dates as long back as 
Aristotle,2 but it is Montesquieu (1752) who is credited for presenting the first systematic 
theory linking geography with development of human society in his classical treatise The 
Spirit of Laws [Olsson (2005)]. The focus of early writers of this school of thought 
[Montesquieu (1752); Huntington (1915) and GilFillan (1920)] 3 was primarily on climate 
and its impact on human effort, though water was also discussed. This genre, however, 
went into oblivion following World War II but resurfaced again only recently. Owing to 
its discontinuity, we divide this school into the classical thought and the more 
contemporary work. 
 
2Aristotle is known for introducing the concept of “Meteorolgica”, i.e., a zone of habitable world 
(latitudinally-oriented). Based on his observations, he conjectured that the most hospitable zones were the mid-
latitude regions [Juergensen and Coyne (n.d.)]. 
3This list is by no means exhaustive; it rather represents the most influential works as noted by the 
research community [see Olsson (2005) on this point]. 
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2.1. The Classical Thought on Geography and Development 
The early theorists asserted that climate has a direst bearing on the temperaments 
and customs of a country’s inhabitants. Montesquieu (1752) argued that people of colder 
climates are vigorous, courageous, phlegmatic, disciplined, and more determined than 
people of hotter climates. People of hotter climates are more fearful and susceptible to 
temptations, less resolute and less capable of decisive action.4 
Huntington in “Civilisation and Climate” contended that mental and physical 
vigour were related to outside temperature. The right combination of temperature and 
humidity lends energy to people,5 which then enables them to be more honest, self-
controlled, and willing to take initiatives. The tropical climate, on the other hand, 
weakens character through inducing a proneness to indulgence, inertia, and weakness of 
will [see Whitebeck (1916)]. 
In similar vein, GilFillan (1920) explained the “Coldward Course of Progress” away 
from early centre of civilisations in Sumer and Egypt in the third millennium B.C (average 
temperature 74˚F), to Berlin (48˚F) in early twentieth century primarily based on climate. He 
reasoned that early civilisations appeared in hot climates because agriculture is easy to appear 
in warm regions, but later, as technology assumed a more important role, leadership moved 
northwards where conditions for mental ability were better [GilFillan (1920)]. 
In an interesting line of work linking water with development, Wittfogel (1957) 
developed the thesis, more popularly known as Oriental Despotism, that hydraulic 
civilisations” (i.e. civilisations dependent on large scale irrigation networks) are more 
prone to be under some kind of despotic rule.  He reasoned that large scale irrigation 
networks implied specialisation and division of labour (for digging, dredging, tool 
making, etc.), an organisational hierarchy for coordinating and directing the activities of 
mass labour, and government control over distribution of water (to ensure proper 
distribution). This led to the development of impersonal governments (as against a tribal 
form of government) with control and monopolisation of political power, taking the 
shape of absolutist states.6   
This strand of thought reached its zenith in the early decades of the twentieth century 
when it had considerable influence on the scientific community and civil society, especially in 
the developed parts of the world. Later, however, it fell into disrepute as “modern 
sensibilities” refused to accept its racial undertones.7  Landes (1999) writes that geography 
had lost ground when, after World War II, Harvard University abolished its geography 
department, and many other universities followed suit. Criticism abound, these classical 
 
4Bok, Hilary, “Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2003/entries/montesquieu/>.  
5Results of field experiments indicated that an average temperature of 65 degree Fahrenheit was 
optimum for physical work, and average temperature of 38 degree Fahrenheit maximised mental activity 
[Whitebeck (1916)]. 
6Wittfogel includes Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, and pre-Colombian Mexico and Peru in this list. 
http://www.riseofthewest.net/thinkers/wittfogel05.htm (adapted from on-line Encyclopedia Britannica’s 
articles). 
7Primarily, this school attributed the superior culture of Western Europe (and its offshoots) to its colder 
climate. 
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theories now constitute a disbanded line of research.8  Though, they continue to influence 
contemporary ideas in this area even today [Stehr and Storch (1998)].  
 
2.2. The Contemporary Thinking on Geography 
Of late, geography is enjoying a kind of renaissance, and a huge effort has been 
launched by contemporary writers on geography [Krugman (1995); Diamond (1999); 
Landes (1999) and Sachs, et al. (Various publications)] to place it back into its lost 
position. This re-launch effort was based on the realisation that the early writers went 
‘too far’ [Landes (1999)]. 
Landes (1999) own effort explains The Wealth and Poverty of the Nations cast 
in terms of geographic endowments i.e. climate, disease and water. He writes that hot 
climate of the tropics not only implied adaptation of work habits to keep people 
inactive during midday (like siesta) but also had negative implications for the disease 
environment as year round heat meant proliferation of pest hostile to men. Water 
supply is also problematic because rainfall, though enough on average, is irregular 
and unpredictable and downpours are extremely harsh, so “cultivation does not 
compete easily with jungle” [Landes (1999), p. 13)]. Storage of water for irrigation 
purposes is difficult on account of very high rates of evaporation. In contrast, Europe 
had (and still has) access to a heavy and reliable rain water, which meant that 
individual farmers were not reliant on a ruling élite managing the irrigation network. 
The fragmented nature of European continent implied intense competition among 
many small states with favourable consequences for trade, institutional development 
and individual freedom. European domination of the world was, eventually, helped 
by its unique topography [Landes (1999)].  
An additional feature of European topography that has received scholarly attention 
is its unique position in term of access to the Atlantic Ocean. Oceanic currents made it 
easy for Europeans to reach the Americas, which had abundant supplies of natural 
resources including precious metals.9   
 Another line of research that links natural resource endowments (e.g. oil, 
minerals, and diamonds etc.) of a country with its growth potential is the ‘Resource 
Curse’ hypothesis. It draws its name from the empirical observation that resource rich 
countries (Latin America and some African countries) have experienced slower growth 
compared to resource poor countries (East Asian NICs). Many explanations are offered 
for this empirical regularity. One is the Dutch Disease Phenomenon. It typically refers to 
a situation where discovery of a primary natural resource appreciates the value of 
currency for that country and diverts investment away from manufacturing and service 
sectors and hence lowers growth rate.10 Others have stressed the political economy 
 
8Climate theories were discredited for their racial undertones and lack of supportive evidence. 
Wittfogel’s thesis of Hydraulic Civilisations fits the ancient Chinese empire but is less valid for India, which 
was unified only under the British rule. Moreover, Europe, despite its fragmented nature, was united under the 
Roman Empire for many centuries. 
9See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b) for empirical verification of this point. Their theory, 
however, stresses that the effect of access to the Atlantic on incomes works through institutions. 
10
 See De Silva (1994), Gylfason (2001a, 2001c), Gylfason, et al. (1999), Matsen and Torvik (2003), 
Mckinley (2005), Nakahodo and Jank (2006). 
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consequences of rich resource base. They argue that natural resource abundance increases 
corruption and rent seeking activities and reduces incentives for productive activities.11  
Though a number of researchers have worked on re-invoking interest in geography as 
a possible explanatory factor behind different evolutionary pattern of regions overtime, but it 
is due to the work of Jeffery Sachs and his colleagues [Sachs (2003, 2001); Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999); Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Gallup (1998)] that geography is finding its 
way back into theoretical and empirical studies of economic growth. In a series of papers 
these authors have tried to show that various measures of prosperity (per capita income, 
growth rates) are strongly correlated with geographical and ecological measures (climate 
zones, disease ecology, distance from coast etc.)  [Sachs (2003)].12  They assert that tropical 
regions are hindered in their development on account of low agriculture productivity, high 
disease burden, and high transport costs.13  Sachs (2001) proposes five hypotheses regarding 
tropical underdevelopment. He summarises his assertions as: (1) technologies in critical areas 
of health, agriculture, construction, energy use, and other manufacturing processes are specific 
to ecological zones; (2) by the start of modern era temperate zone technologies were more 
productive than tropical zone technologies; (3) technological development is an increasing 
returns to scale activity;14 (4) social change processes (especially urbanisation and 
demographic transition) amplified this gap; (5) geopolitical factors (European imperialism, 
control of international financial institutions by rich nations of the world) widened this divide 
even further [Sachs (2001)]. 
Gallup (1998) shows that agriculture productivity is sensitive to ecological 
conditions (climate, water availability, and soil fertility). His empirical findings suggest 
that, compared to the temperate zones, agriculture productivity is 30–35 percent lower in 
the tropics. Gallup and Sachs (2001) document evidence of geography affecting the 
economic performance of countries through higher disease burden. They show that 
countries with intensive malaria had 33 percent lower incomes than countries without 
malaria. Radelet and Sachs (1998) estimate that landlocked country, where shipping cost 
are magnitude of a degree higher than similar coastal economy, experiences slower 
growth.15  Their argument will be taken up again in Section (4) where we discuss the 
debate. 
 
2.3. Geography and Long-run Development 
One of the most influential and controversial work, in recent times, on 
geography and economic development over the long run is that of Diamond (1999). 
 
11Auty (2004), Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005), Deacon and Mueller (2004), Eifert, Gelb, and 
Tallroth (2002), Gylfason and Zoega (2001), Gylfason (2001b), Olsson (2003), Pritchett, Woolcock, Busby, and 
Isham (2004), Ross (2001,1999), Sachs and Warner (2001). 
12Also see Escobal and Torero (2000) for an exposition of the link between geography and growth in 
the context of Peru. 
13High transport costs are due to (1) limited access to sea and ocean navigable rivers (a high percentage 
of population living in hinterlands, higher number of landlocked economies), and (2) greater distance from 
major economic centres of the world.  
14He considers this to be the main amplifier of gap between temperate zone and tropical zone 
economies. 
15A 10 percent increase in distance from the sea is associated with 1.3 percent increase in shipping 
costs. An increase of 50 percent in shipping costs reduces growth rates by 0.3 percent per annum [Radelet and 
Sachs (1998)]. 
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The question that he seeks to address through his work Guns, Germs and Steel: The 
Fates of Human Societies is, why did Europe colonise America (and other parts of 
the world) and not the other way round?16 He asserts that Europe had superior 
technology and political organisation compared to any other region around 1500 
A.D.—the time when epoch of colonisation began to take place. He attributes this to 
different rates of development on different continents from 11,000 B.C.17 to A.D. 
1500. The essence of his thesis is as follows: Eurasia18 (owing to its large size and 
Mediterranean climate) was naturally endowed with the highest number of animal and 
plant species that could be domesticated (see Table 1 below).  
 
Table 1 
 Distribution of Species Suitable for Domestication 
Area Number of Plants Number of Animals 
Near East, Europe, North Africa 33 9 
East Asia 6 7 
Southeast Asia 6 2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 0 
North America 4 0 
Central America 5 0 
South America 2 1 
Australia 2 0 
Source: Olsson and Hibbs (2005). 
 
Domestication of plants and animals had far reaching consequences for the 
Eurasian region. Use of animals in agriculture meant that the farmer could till larger 
tracts of land than he could do so with his own effort alone. Domestication of plants 
meant more calories per acre compared to wild habitat where most species are inedible. 
So, areas with rich biogeographic potential made an early transition to settled 
agriculture (Table 2 below). 
 
Table 2  
Independent Origins of Sedentary Agriculture 
  Area Date Domesticated Plants Domesticated Animals 
Near East 8500 B.C. wheat, barley pea goats, sheep 
China 7500 B.C. Rice, millet pig 
Central Mexico 3500 B.C. Corn, beans turkey 
South Central Andes 3500 B.C. Potato, manioc llama, guinea pig 
Eastern United States 2500 B.C. sunflower None 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4000 B.C. sorghum None 
Adapted from Olsson and Hibbs (2005). 
 
16Typically he asked why a few hundred Spaniards under CortŽs and Pizarro overthrew the Aztec and 
Inca Empires? Why Emperors Montezuma or Atahuallpa did not lead the Aztecs or Incas to conquer Europe? 
17Diamond (1999) asserts that 11,000 B.C. is a suitable starting point from which to compare historical 
developments on the different continents, because this date corresponds to the end of the Pleistocene Era and 
last Ice age (start of the recent era in geological terms). This date also corresponds to the beginning of the 
village life in some parts of the world. Domestication of plants and animals started within a few thousand years 
of this date [Diamond (1999), p. 35]. 
18Includes Europe, parts of Asia, near East, and the Fertile Crescent. 
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Dense population settlements began to emerge. Food surpluses generated in 
agriculture led to increased specialisation of the work force and emergence of “stratified 
and politically centralised societies” with ruling élites. These developments were 
accompanied by technological advancement as craftspeople (those who were not engaged 
in agriculture) devoted themselves to science of metallurgy, and writing etc. The end 
result was that Eurasia had advantage in guns (and germs), swords, oceangoing 
technology (Large ships, maps and other navigation tools) as well as political 
organisation, all of which were products of large, dense, sedentary, stratified societies 
made possible by agriculture. This early advantage allowed Eurasia to colonise the 
Americas and Africa [Diamond (1999)].  
Olsson and Hibbs (2005), in an interesting and innovative work, encapsulate the 
essence of Diamond’s theory and subject it to empirical verification.  They test the 
hypothesis that the initial biogeographic conditions19 determined the timing of transition 
to sedentary agriculture. The resultant (accelerated) technological progress20 yielded 
regional development advantages that to some degree affect present day per capita 
incomes. The following figure (Figure 2) describes the sequencing of their logic.  
Fig. 2. Biogeography and Long-run Economic Development 
 
 
 
Source: Olsson and Hibbs (2005). 
 
While Diamond (1999) did not make an effort to link biogeographic potential 
with the present level of well-being, Hibbs and Olsson (2004) fills this gap. They 
develop a framework that provides a link between initial biogeographic endowment 
and present day incomes, and explains economic development over three major 
stages of history; the hunter-gatherer stage, the agriculture stage, and the industrial 
stage, based on following ‘stylised facts’ (1) agriculture first emerged in areas with 
rich biogeographic potential, (2) there were no ‘inherent differences in ability’ of 
hunter-gatherers to exploit their natural environment, (3) agriculture development 
 
19I.e., bio-geographical conditions 12,000 years ago, before the onset of settled agriculture. 
20See Diamond (1999) for this argument. 
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lead to emergence of a class of people21 who did not have to get involved in food 
production and lived on food surpluses generated by the agriculture sector, (4) the 
emergence of non-food sector set off a process of endogenous knowledge creation 
and population expansion, (5) living standards did not increase much before the 
industrial revolution. Results of the empirical exercise validate their hypothesis. In 
addition, it provides evidence that initial biogeographic potential has direct effect on 
incomes even today. 
We conclude our discussion of the geography school here and turn to the 
institutions school. 
 
3. INSTITUTIONS—THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANT 
The idea that institutions matter for economic outcomes had long been realised in 
the writings of Adam Smith (1776), but it is North (1990) who is recognised for outlining 
a theory of institutions and incorporating them in mainstream economics.22  The basic 
idea that this school of thought propagates is that “institutions matter”.23 Markets, which 
are the hallmark of the Western capitalist system and are responsible for the 
unprecedented expansion of economic activities, do not exist in vacuum. They are 
supported by a complex web of institutional infrastructure [Grief (2005)]. Even a simple 
exchange, e.g. purchase of oranges in public market, is “complex in terms of its 
fundamental characteristics…Underlying the transaction-making it possible-[i]s a 
complex structure of law and its enforcement” [North (1981), p. 35].24  
 
3.1. Institutions and Economic Performance 
The essence of this school of thought is that Institutions, defined as the humanly 
devised constraints that shape and guide human interactions, facilitate exchange [North 
(1990:3)]. They allow societies to capture gains from trade and enhance the size of the 
market by coordinating human activity.  
The neoclassical theory of exchange envisions a frictionless economy where (1) 
markets are competitive, (2) property rights are perfectly defined and costlessly enforced, 
(3) information is perfect and parties to exchange have mental abilities to process this 
information, (4) governments are neutral, and (5) tastes are unchanging [North (1978), p. 
964]. In short, it assumes a situation where transaction costs25 are zero. The fundamental 
problem with this theory, according to North, is that it misconstrues the nature of human 
coordination and cooperation.  
 
21Chiefs, craftsmen, and bureaucrats. 
22North’s earlier work [North (1973, 1981)] was also an effort to highlight importance of institutions, 
but the theory was finalised in his work, “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance” (1990). 
Also see Eggertsson (1990) for how economic behaviour is influenced by institutions. 
23See Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis (1995), Nabli and Nugent (1989), Aron (2000), Jütting (2003), and 
Bennedsen, Malchow-Møller, and Vinten (2005) for review of the institutions school. 
24Implying that the property rights of buyers and sellers are recognised and enforced by a system of 
law. 
25Transaction costs are costs of defining, protecting and enforcing property rights [Barzel (1989)] and 
contracts. 
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A real life situation poses many problems that make coordination difficult. 
First, information is not complete and is mostly asymmetric.26  Even if complete 
information was available, individuals have limited mental capacity to process, 
organise and utilise information—bounded rationality.27 This bounded rationality 
combined with uncertainty in deciphering the environment means that outcomes are 
uncertain under impersonal exchange. Moreover, transaction costs, defined as the 
cost of measurement28 and the cost of enforcement,29 are positive. North (1990) 
argues that “these measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social, 
political and economic institutions” [North (1990), p. 27].  Together these constitute 
the building blocks of his theory. Given these, institutions are needed for an 
exchange to take place and as such, they affect the performance of the economy by 
their effect on the cost of exchange.30 North and Thomas (1973) write, “economic 
growth will occur if property rights make it worthwhile to undertake socially 
productive activity” [North and Thomas (1973), p. 8].  
 
3.2. Institutional Account of Long-run Development 
What explains unprecedented increases in the fortunes of the Western World 
over the last couple of centuries? Douglas North, in a long span of both collaborative 
and individual research [North (1973, 1981, 1990)], explains the economic rise of the 
Western World in terms of the evolution of its institutions from inefficient to 
efficient ones. In discussing the contours of European society between 1100 and 
1800, North and Thomas (1970) write that productivity increases during this time 
period can only be explained by a theory of institutional change [North and Thomas 
(1970), p. 4]. Europe’s recent economic successes are attributed to the industrial 
revolution. They argue that significant changes had occurred in the European society 
before this epoch that allowed it to take advantage of such an opportunity—break 
down of feudal culture that created space for establishing private property rights,31 
 
26One party holds more information than the other. 
27This concept owes its origin to Simon (1957, 1955). While traditional economic theory assumes that a 
rational economic man has complete information and computational skills to analyse this information while 
making a decision, Simon (1955) holds that neither is true. In reality, information is not complete, and the 
individual has limited mental capacity to analyse available information. He terms this concept as ‘bounded 
rationality’. 
28The measurement costs are the cost of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged. 
Commodities, services and performance of individuals have many attributes and their level vary from one 
specimen to another. The measurement of these levels is too costly to be comprehensive or fully accurate. The 
information cost in ascertaining the level of attributes yields measurement costs. 
29The enforcement costs are the cost of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. These 
arise from incomplete information. Because we do not know the attributes of a good or service or all 
characteristics of the performance of an agent we have to devote costly resources to try to measure and monitor 
performance. 
30Also see Runge (1984) for this point. Basically, he argues that institutions “increase the value of a 
stream of benefits associated with economic activity by coordinating behaviour” [Runge (1984), p. 807].   
31The famine of 1315-17, and the Black Death31 of 1347-51 caused a decline in the population of 
Europe which implied significant changes in the relative product values. Marginal lands went out of production. 
Land rents declined for the landlords and real wages of labour increased. Bonds of manorialism became weak as 
land leases were lengthened, and the tenants began to acquire exclusive rights over land. So, by the time 
population began to rise again in the last half of fifteenth century, the structure of feudal society and lord-serf 
relations had changed.  
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expansion of trade,32 and institutional innovations that solved problem of exchange 
and allowed market to expand were the starting points. From there onwards, it were 
individuals and organisations in pursuit of profits that capitalised on these early 
institutional innovations.  
Commercial revolution is considered as the most important economic epoch after 
the Neolithic transformation. Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) write that the 
“European economic growth between the tenth and fourteenth centuries was facilitated 
by the commercial revolution of the Middle Ages” [Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 
(1994), p. 746]. This commercial revolution was made possible by the development of 
institutions that took care of many contractual problems associated with long distance 
trade [Greif (1989, 1993,  2003)]. Long distance trade, owing to geographic separation of 
trading parties, is specified by the separation of quid and quo.33 This posed a commitment 
problem. “The separation of the quid and the quo created the possibility that one party, 
however well-intentioned ex-ante, would find it to his advantage ex-post to reopen the 
bargaining or simply welsh on the deal” [Dam (2006), p. 3].34 Second was the agency 
problem. Traders used to send their cargo to distant markets through agents. One 
difficulty was to ensure that the agent did not deceive the principal. This had serious 
implications for the size of the market since such threats would induce many individuals 
not to take part in the market activities. Since impersonal exchange, characterised by the 
separation of quid and quo, was a common feature in late medieval Europe, and no state 
had developed the legal system to enforce contracts in distant places, institutions had to 
be created to mitigate the contractual problems by countering possibilities of ex-post 
opportunism, i.e., to make parties commit ex-ante that they would not breach the 
contractual obligation ex-post. 
The community responsibility system was one such response [Greif (2003)]. Much of 
the trade in Europe was conducted in the context of local communities. These were self-
governing units and membership of community was not easily acquired.35 Under community 
responsibility system (CRS), every member of the community was liable for the other 
member’s default in inter-community exchange. The strategy for controlling opportunistic 
behaviour, depending upon situation, varied from property confiscation, to cessation of trade 
for a finite period of time (in cases of disagreement that a violation has occurred).36Another 
solution to contractual problems in long distance trade involved merchant guilds. Famous 
among these are the German Hansa and Maghribi traders. These guilds operated on the 
principles of multilateral reputation. German Hansa governed relationships among German 
merchants and foreign towns in their trading relations. It used threat of embargo as retaliation 
 
32Interregional trade was possible because spread of population into new territories opened up areas 
with different resource endowments. Wine trade expanded because viticulture was possible in many new areas 
and fine wine was in demand. Wool trade, particularly of woolen cloth, also expanded. An additional factor 
contributing to expansion of trade was the influx of treasures from the New World, as it contributed to increased 
size of the market and provided impetus for trade.  
33This is in sharp contrast to public market or ‘bazaar’, where quid and quo are exchanged 
simultaneously [Dam (2006)]. 
34The problem was compounded by the issues of jurisdiction. City states could enforce contracts within their 
territories but could not enforce agreements when the other contracting party was in distant city. 
35In Venice, e.g., one had to pay taxes for twenty five years to be eligible for membership. 
36In Florence, for example, thirty six cases of disputes, confiscation and cessation of trade were 
reported [cited in Greif (2003)]. 
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against defection [Greif (1994)].37 Maghribi traders is yet another example of institutional 
innovation aimed at solving agency problem in long distance trade. It was a coalition of 
Jewish traders that operated in the Mediterranean zone in the eleventh century. In the 
absence of contractual relations, goods had to be shipped to their destination town before 
they could be sold. An efficient response to this situation was to use overseas agent to cut 
costs. This posed serious agency problems as the agent could cheat in the business 
transactions conducted in far-off areas. The Maghribi traders got around this problem by 
forming a coalition that retaliated against overseas agents who acted against the interest 
of its members [Greif (1989)]. 
Successes from commercial revolution were soon translated into other institutional 
innovations in the seventeenth century, particularly in England. Introduction of patent 
laws, joint stock companies, insurance companies, creation of central bank, issuance of 
bank notes, discounting bills, interest on deposits are all example of innovations that 
created opportunities for accumulation of physical and human capital for innovative 
activities, for investment in productive activities and, as such, created an environment 
favourable for growth [North and Thomas (1973)]. 
 
3.3. Institutions and Economic Performance—the Evidence 
For a long period of time theoretical research on institutions outpaced empirical 
evidence and that was the strongest criticism against this discipline. Empirical work in 
this field faced serious problems of (1) definition (Which dimension of overall 
institutional framework to use); (2) measurement (How best to measure institutions); and 
(3) endogeniety (Institutions cannot be assumed to be independent of income as higher 
income can make better institutions more affordable [Nabli and Nugent (1989); Aron 
(2000); Jütting (2003); and Bennedsen, Malchow-Møller, and Vinten (2005)]. Beginning 
1990s, a number of studies incorporated the institutions variable in their growth 
regression framework [Barro (1991, 1997); Knack and Keefer (1995); Hall and Jones 
(1999)].38 Using the data provided by the private risk rating companies [ICRG, PRS] as a 
proxy for institutional quality, they all found evidence in support of the ‘institutions 
hypothesis’.39 Improving institutional quality had a positive effect on economic growth.  
However, regressing income on institutions poses a serious estimation problem— 
institutions cannot be assumed to be independent of income. Typically, higher incomes 
can make better institutions more affordable. A valid instrument for institutions is needed 
to counter the incidence of reverse causations.  Most of the earlier work linking 
institutions with income did not tackle this problem as they lacked a purely exogenous 
source of variation for the institutions variable,40 rendering the results of these studies 
 
37One often cited example is the Hanseatic embargo against the city of Bruges that forced the city to adhere 
to its contractual agreement with the German merchants (ibid). 
38Although not credited for it, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) were the pioneering 
studies in using proxies for institutional variables (indices of economic and political freedom from Freedom 
House) in growth regressions. In recent years, availability of data and better estimation techniques have opened  
floodgates of research in this field. 
39Barro (1991) differs from the other two studies in the sense that he did not use institutional quality indices 
but instead used war deaths and revolutions to capture political instability in growth regression framework. 
40Hall and Jones (1999) is one exception, which used distance from the equator as an instrument. They 
did not, however, check the validity of the instrument.  
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biased. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) worked around this problem by 
utilising differences in mortality rates faced by the European colonialists as an instrument 
for current institutions.41 Their estimates suggested that institutions explained 
approximately three-quarter of the income per capita differences in former colonies, and 
once institutions were controlled for measures of geography (distance from equator, 
continental dummies) did not cause income. Later, Rodrik, et al. (2004), Easterly and 
Levine (2003) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) also lend support to the institutions 
hypothesis. 
Another issue that has to be solved within this tradition is which institutions 
matter? North (1990) has identified two types of institutions that are needed for growth—
contract enforcing institutions, and coercion constraining institutions (property rights).42  
Whereas contract enforcing institutions relate to private contracts between citizens, 
coercion constraining institutions define contract between the state and its citizens 
[Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)]. In a series of papers, Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002, 2003) and La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) have stressed the importance of legal 
system (a proxy for contract enforcing institutions) for growth. Their work, more 
generally dubbed under “law matters”, argues that differences in legal systems cause 
different political and economic outcomes [Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)].43  Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) find that procedural formalism, which is 
much greater for civil law countries, is related with judicial delays, corruption, and unfair 
judicial decisions.44  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) report that, compared to 
common law countries, countries governed by civil law have worse governments, i.e. more 
interventionist in the sense of less secure property rights, worse regulation, and inefficient 
implying bureaucratic delays and little tax compliance.45 Acemoglu and Johnson (2003), in an 
effort to “unbundle institutions” and determine which institutions matter the most, find that 
when measures of contract enforcement and property rights are put simultaneously in their 
regression model, the later trump over contract enforcement institutions. Their results imply a 
direct effect of property rights on long run development. Legal system (proxy for contract 
 
41See following section for their reasoning. 
42Coercion constraining institutions ensure protection of property rights against expropriation by a 
predatory state, whereas “the predatory state would specify a set of property rights that maximised the revenue 
of the group in power, regardless of its impact on the wealth of the society as a whole” [North (1981), p. 22].  
Also see Greif (2005) for this point. 
43Legal systems, across the world, are predominantly influenced by either English common law or 
French civil law traditions, except for a few countries which follow German, Scandinavian or socialist law. 
These two systems, which were transplanted to recipient countries through conquest and colonisation, are 
different from each other in very fundamental ways. Common law relies on independent judges, broad legal 
principles and oral arguments and was developed in part to protect the rights of common citizens from 
expropriation by the monarchs. In contrast, civil law relies on professional judges (appointed by the royalty to 
further the interest of the sovereign), legal codes, and written records [Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)]. As a result, 
both legal traditions differ in terms of degree of formalism. 
44Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) construct an index of legal procedural 
formalism based on the number of procedures that litigants and courts use to evict a tenant for non-payment and 
to collect a bounced check. 
45Same is true for countries governed by social, German or Scandinavian law. In all cases, common law 
countries have better governments. 
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enforcement) does not bear a direct effect on growth, but appears to have an impact on 
financial intermediation (stock market development).  
 
4. THE ROOT CAUSE: INSTITUTIONS OR GEOGRAPHY? 
In previous sections we discussed the two schools of thought and the empirical 
evidence that they present in favour of their hypotheses. We mentioned earlier in the 
paper that these factors are now considered as “deeper determinants” that explain more 
proximate causes of growth. But which of these provides a more fundamental explanation 
of the divergence in economic performance across countries. The geography school 
argues that the climate, soil quality, water availability, and disease ecology of a region 
has a direct bearing on its growth potential. The institutions school, on the other hand, 
assigns a primal role to the institutions of the society. For them, institutions define the 
incentive structure facing an individual who then decides whether to invest in capital and 
to engage in productive activities. What are the arguments put forth by each school in 
support of their hypothesis? 
The geography school points out a number of important geographical 
correlates of modern economic growth. First, countries that lie in the tropics are 
poorer compared to other regions of the world. The average income of tropical 
countries is $3326, while that of temperate countries is $14828 (excluding socialist 
countries).46 Twenty three of the top thirty countries—as ranked by 1995 PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita47—are situated in the temperate zone. The following (Figure 
3) is a map of GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) and clearly depicts that tropical 
countries are poorer compared to temperate zone countries [Gallup and Sachs 
(1999)]. 
 
Fig. 3. 
 
[Source:  Gallup and Sachs (1999)]. 
 
46Tropical countries are defined as those where half or more of the land area is within the tropic of 
cancer and the tropic of Capricorn.  
47Their source for GDP figures is World Bank’s World Development Indicators1998. 
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Second, coastal regions have higher incomes than landlocked regions. Except for a 
few countries within Western and Central Europe, landlocked economies are nearly all 
poor.  Their average income ($1771) is much smaller than the average income of non-
European coastal economies ($5567) [Gallup and Sachs (1999)]. 
Third, economic growth has been lower for countries afflicted by high disease 
burden. Of the 150 countries in the world with population of over one million, 44 have 
intensive malaria. Of these, 35 are in Africa. Malaria intensive countries are on average 
poorer (average income $1526) than countries without malaria (average income $8268). 
The richest 31 countries have no malaria.  The severity and spread of malaria is linked to 
the climate and ecology.48  Successful cases of malaria eradication over the past few 
decades belong to temperate ecological zones with low nighttime outdoor temperatures 
and less efficient malaria vectors. Ninety percent of world’s malaria is in Africa because 
sub-Saharan Africa exclusively houses the most efficient vector49 Anopheles gambiae and 
where falciparum malaria predominates50 [Gallup and Sachs (2000)]. 
Gallup and Sachs (1999) write that “leading thinkers have pointed to four major 
areas in which geography will play a fundamental direct role in economic productivity: 
transport costs, human health, agriculture productivity (including animal husbandry); and 
proximity and ownership of natural resources” [Gallup and Sachs (1999), p. 9].  A number 
of empirical studies also demonstrate that geography does differentiate. Agriculture 
productivity in the tropics is lower than that in the temperate areas [Gallup (1998)]. 
Tropical countries share a higher burden of disease, which lowers their per capita incomes 
by almost 33 percent [Gallup and Sachs (2000)]. Landlocked countries face higher cost of 
transportation that lowers their growth rate [Radelet and Sachs (1998)].  
Remember that the institutions school had asserted that geography has no 
independent effect on income, apart from an indirect effect working through institutions. 
Sachs (2003) responds to this claim by regressing income on institutions (rule of law), 
openness, and geography (malaria prevalence) simultaneously. His results show that 
malaria has a direct and independent effect on income i.e., it does not lose significance 
even if institutions variable appears simultaneously in the regression framework. 
Carstensen and Gundlach (2006) also confirm this result. 
In testing Diamond’s theory of long-run development, Olsson and Hibbs (2005) 
report that countries with favourable initial biogeographic conditions made an early 
transition to sedentary agriculture, which gave them a head start over other regions in 
terms of technological advancement and thus yielded wide disparities in economic 
development across the world. According to their study this biogeographic endowment 
has a direct effect on income even today once the impact of institutions is controlled. In a 
later work, Hibbs and Olsson (2004) agree that institutions are strongly connected with 
national economic performance, and that capital accumulation and technological 
development, the proximate causes of growth, are “molded by the political institutions 
essential for the smooth functioning of markets”, but draw attention to “still deeper and 
 
48The geographical spread of malaria is determined by the ecology of parasites (different species of 
malaria plasmodia) and disease vectors (different species of Anopheles mosquitoes) [Gallup and Sachs (2000)]. 
49Vector capacity measures the efficiency with which mosquitoes carry malaria from one human to 
another and has major impact on the feasibility of controlling malaria (ibid). 
50P. falciparum is the most malignant form, compared to less serious P. vivax, P. malariae and P. ovale 
(ibid). 
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more—nearly—ultimate sources of contemporary prosperity”—the initial biogeographic 
conditions.  
Of late, the institutions school has come out very strongly to assert their point of 
view.  Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) write, “economic institution matter for economic growth 
because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in society, in particular, they 
influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, and the organisation 
of production. Although cultural and geographical factors may also matter for economic 
performance, differences in economic institutions are the major source of cross-country 
differences in economic growth and prosperity” [Acemoglu, et al. (2005a), p. 3], 
emphasis added]. The following is a scatter plot of GDP per capita in 1995 and a measure 
of property rights—“protection against expropriation risk”.51 This plot shows that 
countries with better economic institutions (more secure property rights) have higher 
average incomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main thrust of the argument of the institutions school of thought in the present debate 
is that geography affects income only indirectly via its effect on institutions.52 At least two 
theories linking geography (endowments) with institutional development are in vogue. One, 
perhaps more current these days, is the “germs theory”53 and is due to Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001). Their reasoning is summarised here: Europeans adopted different colonisation 
strategies in different colonies. They established efficient institutions in places where conditions 
 
51The data for this scatter plot is taken from Acemoglu, et al. (2001). The GDP figures are PPP adjusted 
per capita GDP for 1995 from World Bank’s 1999 World Development Indicators. The data on property rights 
comes from Political Risk services (a private company that assesses the risk of investment being expropriated in 
different countries), and is an average over the period 1985-1995. This measure of property right has been used 
extensively in research [Knack and Keefer (1995); Hall and Jones (1999); Acemoglu, et al. (2001, 2002)]. 
52
 In previous section we have quoted empirical evidence in favour of institutions hypothesis. Here we 
limit the evidence to only those studies that work around the institutions-geography framework. 
53
 This term was used by Easterly and Levine (2003), 
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were suitable for their settlement (measured by low mortality rate), and extractive institutions 
where they could not settle in large numbers and extractive institutions were more profitable for 
them.54 These early institutions persisted till present time. Using differences in European 
mortality as a purely exogenous source of variation for institutions they estimated the effect of 
institutions on incomes. Their results suggest that, for former colonies, about three quarter of 
differences in economic performance is explained by differences in institutions. And once 
institutions are accounted for, geography variables do not explain economic performance.  
Earlier Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) had developed a similar argument, called the 
“crop theory”, about the linkages between geography and institutions.  They argued that 
differential resource endowments of the new world influenced the type of institutions that were 
ultimately established. Land, soil quality and climate of Latin America and the Caribbean were 
suitable for large scale plantation crops (e.g., sugar). These areas developed highly stratified 
societies, where white minority élite dominated the majority slave labourers, with extractive 
institutions. North America, on the other hand, had resource endowment suitable for small 
family sized farms for wheat production. This led to more homogenous distribution of wealth 
and power in the society, so more egalitarian institutions developed that protected the rights of a 
broad base of citizens. Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) further document evidence that the ruling 
élites hindered accumulation of human capital by the majority of population, and halted 
development of democratic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Easterly and Levine (2003) test this “crop theory” of institutional development and 
confirm the hypothesis that resource endowments affect income indirectly via institutions but 
do not have a direct effect on income. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) extend this 
endowments— institutions—income framework further by incorporating ‘integration’ as 
another “deeper determinant”. They test the ‘germs theory’ of institutional development due 
to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). The results of their study also confirm that 
‘endowments’ do not explain income and hence establish the ‘primacy’ of institutions over 
geography.55 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) further document the Korean experience in favour of 
the institutions hypothesis. Korea gained independence from Japan after World War II. 
Soon after, it was divided into North Korea and South Korea at the 38th parallel. 
Before this division, Korea shared same history, culture, and geography.56  Both 
countries shared same disease environment, geographical possibilities of access to 
markets, and transport costs. After this split, the two parts were organised in radically 
different ways. The North Korea under Kim Il Sung opted for communist policies, and 
South Korea followed the path of the capitalist system. By the year 2000, per capita 
income in South Korea was $16100, while that of North Korea stagnated at $1000. Since 
the geography, disease environment, access to markets and transport costs did not change 
radically after the separation, the divergent growth experience of the two economies can 
only be attributed to differences in institutions.  
 
54
 Examples of settlement colonies are: USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
55Both geography and integration variables are insignificant in the regression equation.  
56CIA Factbook describes climate of North Korea as “temperate with rainfall concentrated in summer” 
and its terrain as “mostly hills and mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys; coastal plains wide in west, 
discontinuous in east”. It describes climate of South Korea as “temperate, with rainfall heavier in summer than 
winter” and the terrain as “mostly hills and mountains; wide coastal plains in west and south” [Acemoglu, et al. 
(2005a), p. 18]. 
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The second argument that they put forward in support of the institutions 
hypothesis is “the Reversal of Fortune” among former European colonies. Around 1500, 
the Mughals in India, and the Aztec and Inca Empires in the Americas were among the 
richest of civilisations whereas the territories of North America, Australia and New 
Zealand were inhabited by less developed civilisations. However, after the European 
colonisation, there has been a reversal in incomes. Areas where the Mughal, Aztec and 
Inca Empires once stood are now occupied by societies that are ranked at the lower end 
of world income distribution, and North America, Australia and New Zealand are among 
the richest nations today (see Figure 5 below).57  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They argue that this reversal cannot be explained by the geography hypothesis.  
The only explanation is offered by the institutions hypothesis. In Acemoglu, et al. (2002)  
they provide evidence in support of this assertion. Using urbanisation rates in 1500 A.D. 
as a proxy for prosperity in former colonies,58  these authors show that areas that were 
prosperous before colonisation are poor now, and vice versa. If one goes by the 
geography hypothesis then areas that were rich in 1500 (owing to their geographical 
advantage) should be rich today since geography did not change much. This reversal is 
explained by the fact that European colonialist established worse institutions in places 
where they could not settle and instead followed an extractive policy. In contrast, areas 
where they could settle in large numbers efficient institutions were put in place. Current 
prosperity of these settlers’ colonies is explained by institutions hypothesis. The scatter 
plot below shows that colonies that were rich in 1500 have worse institutions today.59 
 
 
57
 This graph is based on data from Maddison (1995). 
58Since reliable data for income for all colonies is not available for that period, they argue that only 
prosperous regions could have afforded large populations.  
59Institutional data is described above. Urbanisation rates in 1500 are a proxy for prosperity at that time 
since income data is not available and is taken from Acemoglu, et al. (2002). 
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Timing of reversal is another issue for Acemoglu, et al. (2005a). This reversal 
occurred around the eighteenth century when previously poor colonies took over the 
relatively rich colonies (Fig. 4). This time period coincides with the beginning of the 
industrial revolution. Diamond (1999) had argued that Europe had an advantage over 
others continents due to its superior technology. Since this technology was ecological 
zone specific, i.e., suitable for temperate climates, tropical regions could not use it to 
their advantage. But reversal in incomes occurred around a time period that is 
characterised by beginning of the industrial revolution. They argue that it is hard to 
imagine why industrial technologies will not function in the tropics. For them, the 
geography hypothesis does not explain evolution of world income over the long run. 
Institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run growth.  
 
Taking the Debate Further—Some Critical Observations 
The discussion so far does not provide a clear answer to the basic, and unarguably 
the most important, question facing the development community today. What is the 
fundamental determinant of the differences in incomes across the world?  Does 
“geography determine” or “institutions matter”? Which of these two hypotheses provides 
a more credible account of the evolution of world income overtime? Though the 
academia has not come to a consensus yet, one can definitely single out the more 
plausible candidate. In doing so it is also desirable to pose certain questions that each 
school has failed to address in their respective analyses.     
Indeed, the geography hypothesis identifies some important correlates of 
economic development, but few points are worth mentioning. The geography hypothesis, 
in its simplest form, stresses a kind of determinism that is time-invariant in its effect. 
A
v
er
ag
e 
Pr
o
te
ct
io
n
 
ag
ai
n
st
 
Ri
sk
 
o
f E
x
pr
o
pr
ia
tio
n
, 
19
85
–
95
 
Urbanisation in 1500 
Fig. 6.  Urbanisation in 1500 and Average Protection against the  
    Risk of Expropriation 1985–95 
Deeper Determinants of Long-run Development 
 
37 
That is, areas that were rich initially, owing to better geographic endowments, should be 
rich today. However, we witness that some of the new world economies (USA, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) surpassed the initially more prosperous areas of Asia and 
parts of Africa (Fig. 5 above). Second, geography school suggests an upper bound on the 
development capacity of the region owing to its location. It fails to explain why 
Singapore (and Hong Kong), despite its ‘tropical location’, joined the league of 
prosperous temperate zone economies. Gallup and Sachs (1999) write that the average 
income of tropical countries ($3326) is much below that of temperate countries 
($9320). They further write that if socialist countries are taken out of temperate zone 
countries then the average income of this group rises even further ($14828). The 
question remains, why socialist countries of temperate zone linger behind their capitalist 
counterparts? If geography is destiny, then why do economic fortunes of North Korea and 
South Korea, which share similar geography, differ so much? Similarly, if one were to go 
with Diamond’s analysis, then Olsson (2005) very rightly questions why countries of the 
Fertile Crescent, which have the highest biogeographic potential and where agriculture 
first appeared, have lagged behind. The geography school has to provide answers to these 
questions and fill many loopholes before it can be considered as the ‘ultimate’ factor 
behind economic performance. 
Invariably, the institutions school provides a more credible account of the economic 
development over the long run.  Countries that developed strong and efficient institutions 
experienced substantial improvements in their incomes. This school, however, has yet to 
provide satisfactory answer to one important question. If institutions explain differences in 
income across countries then what explains differences in institutions? Why some societies 
develop efficient institutions while others do not? Various theories have been put forward in 
this regard, and they all are based on endowments as the ultimate exogenous explanatory 
variable. One such attempt is the “germs theory”, due to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001), of institutional development. While this theory effectively answers question regarding 
underdevelopment of former colonies, but what about those countries that were never 
colonized? Why these societies failed to develop efficient institutions? Another significant 
effort was by Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) who presented the “crop theory” of institutional 
development, but their analysis is also partial as it only dealt with the geographic regions of 
the Americas (North and South) and the Caribbean.  There is a need to come up with a holistic 
theory about development of institutions if we are to have a comprehensive understanding of 
the long-run development process. And here the institutions school can borrow some more 
insights from other contemporary research. Olsson (2005) suggests that initial endowments 
(biogeographic potential) can be one possible factor. Moore (2002) hypothesizes that states 
relying on unearned income (due to ample supply of natural resources and international aid) 
do not make an effort to govern their citizens effectively; hence, he incorporates forces of 
globalisation in his analysis. The institutions school has to widen its scope of analysis to make 
further progress.  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
What is the fundamental determinant of differences in economic performance 
across countries? The literature has highlighted two such candidates: institutions and 
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geography. The geography hypothesis asserts that these differences are accounted for by 
the geography (climate, geology, topography, ecology) of a region, which directly affects 
the quality of land, labour, and production techniques. The alternative, the institutions 
hypothesis, on the other hand, documents economic development of human society as a 
story of evolution of the institutions of a society. It is the institutions of a society that 
shape the incentive structure for its people to engage in productive activities. For them, 
geography does not explain economic performance beyond its ability to explain 
institutional development. Put simply, the geography school argues for a direct impact of 
geography on the economic performance of countries, whereas, the institutions school 
argues that the impact of geography on income runs through its effect on institutions. 
In discussing the geography hypothesis, we divided this school into the classics 
and the contemporaries. The classical work focused attention on climate and topography. 
The climate theories of growth assert that climate of a country shapes work habits and 
productivities of its people. Wittfogel’s (1957) theory of hydraulic civilisations brought 
out importance of topography for development. Important recent contributions in this 
area include Diamond (1999), Landes (1999), and Scahs and his colleagues [Sachs (2003, 
2001); Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Gallup (1998)]. 
Contemporary work on geography points out five major areas in which geography 
directly affects economic productivity—technological development, agriculture 
productivity, human health, transport costs, and proximity and ownership of natural 
resources. 
The institutions school, however, contends that the enormous variations in 
incomes across countries are due to differences in institutions. We discussed North’s 
theory (1990) of Institutions. He argues that institutions define the incentive structure for 
a society so that individuals decide to invest in education, equipment and machineries, 
innovation and attain prosperity as a result of these endeavors. In describing an 
institutional account of the long-run development, North and Thomas (1973) and North 
(1981, 1990) claim that the rise of the Western World can only be explained in terms of 
evolution of its institutions from inefficient to efficient ones, which allowed individuals 
and organisations in search of profits to take advantage of economic opportunities. The 
institutions hypothesis finds empirical support from numerous studies [Knack and Keefer 
(1995); Hall and Jones (1999); Acemoglu, et al. (2001); Easterly and Levine (2003); 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004)].  
In discussing the debate about the deeper determinants of growth we reviewed 
arguments and evidence provided by the two schools of thought, and concluded in favour of 
the institutions hypothesis as the geography hypothesis does not provide a consistent account 
of the evolution of world income over the long-run. We also highlighted the weakness of the 
institutions hypothesis—its inability to explain the process of institutional development, and 
recommended that this school can proceed ahead by borrowing ideas from other 
contemporary research [Moore (2002) and Olsson (2005)]. 
In the end, we endorse the proposition that institutions matter. Existence and 
enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of people; enforcement of 
contracts; rule of law, so that powerful elites are constrained from expropriating the 
property of other less powerful sections of the society; impartial and speedy 
dispensation of justice; honest and efficient governments are conditions that are 
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necessary for protecting fruits of entrepreneurship without which development cannot 
proceed. Developing countries, like Pakistan, stand to gain a lot from investment in 
improving their institutional infrastructure. If Pakistan can improve the protection of 
private property against expropriation to the level of Singapore, its per capita income 
would increase manifolds nearing income levels in Singapore.60 “Recognising the 
importance of institutions in economic development… is the first step toward 
significant progress in jump-starting rapid growth in many areas of the world today” 
[Acemoglu (2003), p. 30]. 
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